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AFFECTING THE THIRD 
WORLD ARMS TRADE 
Robert E. Looney 
The neglect given by economic researchers to third world arms trade is 
somewhat surprising. Particularly, considering that as a group these 
countries have accounted for three quarters of the world trade in 
conventional weapons. 
Even to the limited extent that the topic has been covered in the 
literature, the concentration has be.en on economic and political policies of 
the major suppliers. In contrast, the purpose of this study is to provide some 
analysis of the key issues surrounding third world arms production and 
purchases in recent years. 
• • • • • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the more neglected areas of international trade research has 
been the third world arms trade. This is somewhat surprising considering 
the fact that since 1965 third world countries have jointly comprised the 
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world's leading market for conventional weapons, accounting for as much as 
three-quarters of the international trade in military systems. Between 1978 
and 1985 alone, the less-developed countries ordered an estimated $259 
billion worth of arms and ammunition (in current dollars) from foreign 
suppliers. 
Traditionally, analysis of the third world arms trade has concentrated 
on the economic and political policies pursued by the major suppliers. The 
policy on supply adopted by each country is invariably determined by 
political decisions which may reflect not only the position of the supplying 
country in the international system but also, in the case of Western 
countries, of the economic profitability of these sales.1 Broadly speaking, 
there are three factors that determine the pattern and level of supply of 
arms: 
I 
1. The influence factor --which refers to the control of arms 
transfers by a supplier in order to maintain or achieve a position of 
hegemony or domination, .either within the receiving country, or 
more widely within the third world. 
2. The economic profitability factor --which relates to the economic 
advantages of large-scale production and long production runs. 
Both the government in the form of the military, and the firms 
producing arms benefit by selling more and thereby reducing unit 
costs. As long as an item is procured by a foreign country's armed 
forces, the cost to the government of producing country drops 
correspondingly, but firms may also benefit with higher profits. 
3. The restrictive factor --whereby the supplier declines to provide 
arms to other countries if it is likely to operate against the 
economic and/or hegemony interests of the supplier. 2 
See for example Albrecht, Ulrich, "West Germany and Italy: New Strategies," Journal of 
International Affairs, Summer 1986, pages 129-142; Brigagao, Clovis, "'The Brazilian Arms 
Industry," Journal of International Affairs, Summer 1986, pages 101-115; and Klieman, Aaron, 
"Middle Range Arms Suppliers: The Israeli Case," Journal of International Affairs, Summer 
1986, pages 115-29. ' 
2 
Ayres, Ron, "Arms Production as a Form of Import-Substituting Industrialization: The 
Turkish Case," World Development, Vol. II, No. 9, September 1983, pages 813-823. 
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Similarly to date, most of the literature on the subject of third world 
arms production has cited strategic and political factors as the predominant 
motives underlying the creation of arms industries in developing countries: 
The establishment of the domestic arms industry is often 
predominantly a political act which naturally has strong 
economic and technological underpinnings. The domestic 
capacity to produce weapons is a means of isolating oneself from 
the political and commercial pressures which the suppliers of 
advanced weapon systems, both governments and firms, can 
apply. That is why the arms-production capacity is concentrated 
in those developing countries which have faced an actual or a 
threat of an arms embargo and/ or which have become involved 
in protracted regional conflicts. 3 
What economic literature there is on the subject has tended to 
concentrate largely on the supply of arms exports from the industrial 
countries. The economic element of demand has largely been ignored, with 
emphasis largely confined to arms races, and local conflicts in accounting for 
the observed patterns of third world arms imports.4 
Approaches towards understanding the motivation for the establish-
ment and growth of indigenous arm~ production in the third world have 
also been sketchy on the role played by and relative. importance of economic 
factors. Presumably, one of the major reasons for establishing indigenous 
manufacturing capability is to reduce the level of arms imports, thus 
alleviating somewhat the overall pressures on the balance-of-payments. 
3Vayrynen, Raimo, .. The Arab Organization of Industrialization: A Case Study in the 
Multinational Production of Arms," Current Research on Peace and Violence, 1979, page 66. 
4 
See for example the country studies of Argentina and Venezuela in Looney, Robert E., 
The Political Economy of Latin American Military Expenditures, Lexington, MA: Lexington 
Books, 1986. See also the country studies in Katz,James, (ed.), Arms Production in Developing 
Countries, Lexington, MA: · Lexington Books, 1984; Naur, Maja, "'Industrialization and 
Transfer of Civilian and Military Technology t-0 the Arab Countries," Cu"ent Research on 
Peace and Violence, 1980, pages 153-176; Adekanye,J. Bayo, "Domestic Production of Arms 
and rhe Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria," Cu"ent Research on Peace and Violence, 
1983, pages 258-269. 
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Interestingly enough, the literature has had little to say on this aspect of the 
subject. Nor has there been any detailed empirical examination of the 
impact that indigenous production has had on· third world arms imports.l 
The main purpose of the analysis that follows is to shed some light on 
several key issues surrounding third world arms production and importa-
tion. Specifically: 
1. Have developing countries producing arms been able to 
significantly reduce their importation of arms, relative to non-
arms producing countries? 
2. What other variables significantly affect the importation of arms 
by developing countries? 
3. Are the determinants of arms imports fairly uniform throughout 
the third world, or are there several significant subgroupings of 
countries characterized by unique patterns of arms imports? And, 
4. How important has external public borrowing been in facilitating 
arms imports by developing countries? And, again, is this factor 
fairly uniform throughout the third world or is it specific to certain 
subgroupings of countries? 
The general approach taken in the present analysis is one of 
integrating and extending several themes developed recently in the 
literature. 6 Of particular interest is to identify and quantify the 
l 
For a notable start in this direction see the framework for analysis developed in 
Alexander, Arthur; Butz, William, and Mihalka, Michael, "'Modeling the Production and 
International Trade of Arms: An Economic Framework for Analyzing Policy Alternatives,'" 
Rand Series in International Security and Arms Control, March 1981. 
6 
See in particular: Looney, Robert E., and Frederiksen, P.C., '"Profiles of Latin American 
Military Producers,'' International Organization, 1986; Looney, Robert E., "Military Expendi-
tures in Latin America: Budgetary Tradeoff Analysis,'' Journal of Economic Development, 
1986, Looney, Robert E., "Determinants of Per Capita Military Expenditures in Developing 
Countries,'' Manchester Papers on Economic Development, November 1986; and Looney, 
Robert E., '"Impact of Arms Production on Third World Income Distribution and Growth,'" 
Economic Development and Cultural Chagne, 1988; (/Jrthcoming). 
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interrelationships between arms imports, general resource constraints, 
third world arms production, central government budgetary priorities, and 
external public debt associated with military expenditures. 
The main premise of this study is that a number of key issues 
surrounding third world arms imports cannot be adequately explained or 
understood without simultaneously addressing the general environment of 
economic constraints facing third world policy makers, that is the factors 
affecting arms production, arms imports, military expenditures/budgetary 
priorities, and external public debt are so interrelated that emphasis on one 
to the exclusion of the other will more often than not produce gross 
overgeneralizations incapable of providing guidance as to likely levels of 
future third world arms imports.7 
II. PATTERNS OF ARMS PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS 
Vayrynen has argued that the indigenous production of various types 
of weapons systems in developing countries is unlikely to produce overall 
reductions in total arms imports: 
7 
The domestic production of arms is, indeed, an effort to ensure 
capacity to pursue independent foreign and military policy. 
This independence is, however, often a mere myth because the 
domestic production of arms only seldom significantly curtails 
the import of arms and even if this happens the dependence on 
foreign military technology assumes only new, and even deeper 
forms. The economic effects of arms imports are mostly' 
financial by their character, while the dependence on technology 
and intermediary inputs needed in the military industry has a 
negative impact on the entire industrial structure of the 
8 
country. 
More importantly single equation estimates of the factors contributing to arms imports 
are likely to lead to biased coefficients. A two stage least squares estimation procedure is a more 
appropriate technique for assessing the relative role played by economic factors in affecting 
arms imports, indigenous production, and external public debt. 
8 
Vayrynen, op. cit. 
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On the surface, this image of indigenous third world arms production 
seems to be borne out to a certain extent by the limited amount of 
information available on these industries. What statistics we have on the 
subject comes largely from the Swedish International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRl).9 SIPRI's data value weapons produced under license as 
both production and imports. This share not only reflects the substitution 
of production for imports, but it also indicates the degree of independence in 
third world arms production. The SIPRI data show a slow but steady 
increase in arms import replacement during the 1960s after which the ratio 
leveled off at about 10 percent during the 1970s. IO The large increases~in 
arms imports during the 1970s by a number of countries without sizeable 
arms production --such as Iran, ~raq, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria--
explain the leveling off despite the steady increase in total production 
values. For the 1980s, there is again an upward trend. Interestingly enough, 
however, the SIPRI figu.res show that it is not the countries with the highest 
production values that have become least dependent on arms imports. The 
import values are still much higher .than the production values in India and 
Israel. In India, substitution is even decreasing. The highest production-to-
import ratios are instead found in Brazil (also reflecting substantial arms 
exports), North Korea and South Africa. To a lesser extent this is also 
true for South Korea and Taiwan. 11 
If this is in fact the case, it would appear that the arms industry in 
developing countries is following a path fairly typical of the package of 
policies often used to encourage import-substitution industrialization. In 
this regard, the literature on import-substitution has been fairly negative, 
again much of it questioning whether or not the programs. associated with 
9 . 
See for example, Brzoska, Michael, and Ohlsoq, Thomas (eds.), Arms Production in the 
Third World, Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1986. 
IO 
Ibid., page 27. 
II 
Ibid., page 28. 
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import-substitution have resulted in reduci~g imports in those sectors 
singled out for import replacement. 12 
While it is apparent that the import substitution policies in the arms 
industry initiated by a number of developing countries have actually reduced 
the imports of specific armaments, have these same policies resulted in a 
general reduction in arms imports? How much of this reduction in arms 
imports is attributable to the import substitution process? To answer these 
questions an assessment must first be made of the factors (both econo~ic 
and strategic) affecting arms imports. 
III. FACTORS AFFECTING THIRD WORLD ARMS IMPORTS 
A number of economic and political factors interact to affect the level 
of third world arms imports. The model developed below attempts to 
capture the impact of as many of these variables as possible, recognizing of 
course that for any individual country in any one year arms imports may 
deviate considerably from their average or normal levels due to: 
1. a big purchase, associated with the adoption of a major new 
system; 
2. the outbreak of internal or external conflict; 
3. the completion of a phase of equipment modernization; 
4. a marked change in government priorities, due to a change in 
regime; 
5. a shift in foreign alliances: 
This list is of course not exhaustive, but simply intended to stress the 
potential year-to-year instability of arms imports. On the other hand, many 
of these problems can be assumed to average out in cross-section analysis. 
12 • 
Bruton, H.J., "'The Import Substitution Strategy of Economic Development: A Survey," 
Pakistan Development Review, 1970, pages 123-146. 
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The Economic Environment 
There is a growing body of literature suggesting that a number of 
governmental budgetary patterns are reflective of the relative degree of 
foreign exchange scarcity faced by policy makers. Here foreign exchange 
scarcity is seen as a multidimensional factor, not easily characterized by one 
simple index such as a country's holdings of international reserves. 13 
Research on the impact of military expenditures on growth has indicated 
that general groupings of countries on the basis of their overall degree of 
resource scarcity can be useful in identifying contrasting governmental 
expenditure patterns in the third world. 14 
Presumably, those countries which have either more domestic re-
sources (savings and investment) or greater access to foreign captial 
ceterius paribus will be able to support a higher level of arms imports. On 
the other hand, those countries with a lower level of domestic resources or 
less access to international capital will not have as high a level of arms 
imports. 
Using factor analysis on a large group of World Bank variables 
depicting government debt, export and import patterns, and capital flows, 
the main trends in the data were identified and a discriminant analysis was 
then performed using as variables those with the highest loading on each of 
13 
Looney, Robert E., and Frederiksen, P.C., "Defense Expendicures, External Public Debt 
and Growth in Developing Countries," ]011rnal of Peace Research, December 1986; Looney, 
Robert E., "Impact of Military Expenditures on Third World Debt," Canadian ]011rna/ of 
Development Studies, 1987. 
14 
See Frederiksen, P.C. and Looney, R.E., "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth 
in Developing Countries: Some Further Empirical Evidence," ]011rna/ of Economic 
Development, July 1982, pages 113-125; Frederiksen, P.C. and Looney, R.E., "Defense 
Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries," Armed Forces and Society, 
Summer 1983, pages 633-645; Frederiksen, P.C. and Looney, R.E., "Another Look at Defense 
Spending and Economic Growth in Developing Countries," Defense Analysis, 1985; 
Frederiksen, P.C. and Looney, R.E., "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in 
Developing Countries: A Reply," Armed Forces and Soaiety, Winter 1985, pages 298-301; and 
Looney, R.E. and Frederiksen, P.C., "Defense Expenditures, External Public Debt and Growth 
in Developing Countries," ]011rnal of Peace Research, December 1986, pages 329-332. 
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the individual factors. 15 The orthogonal rotation assures that each variable 
selected had a relatively low degree of col'relation with the others in the 
sample. The variables thus selected for splitting the countries into two 
groups on the basis of relative foreign exchange scarcity were: 
1. Gross Inflow of Public Loans/Exports, 1982 
2. Total Public External Debt, 1982 
3. Gross International Reserves, 1982 
4. Public External Debt as a Percent of GDP, 1982 
5. Growth in Imports, 1970-1982 
6. External Debt Service as a Percent of GDP, 1982 
7. Public External Debt as a Percent of GDP, 1970. 
The results of the discriminant analysis show a high degree of 
probability of correct placement in each group, that is, the discriminating 
variables selected from the factor analysis are able to split the sample 
countries into two fairly distinct groupings based largely on the external 
debt situation facing each set of co1:1ntries. (See Table, I page 386). Group I 
countries in general seem to be the poorer, .less economically dynamic 
nations, this group being heavily weighted with African and poorer Latin 
American countries. The Group II countries, on the other hand, consists of 
several major oil exporters and several of the more dynamic newly 
industrializing nations such as Mexico, Greece, India, Korea, Spain, 
Algeria and Malaysia. 
Further insight into the two groups can be gained by examining the 
means of the variables used in the discriminant analysis: 
1. The Group 1 countries resorted to a much higher (3.6 times) inflow 
of external public loans in.1982 relative to their exports that year. 
15 • 
Data were taken from the World Bank, World Development Report, Washington, D.C.: 
The World Bank, (various issues.) The analysis is based on SAS Urer'I Guide: Statiiticr, Cary, 
NC: SAS Institute, 1982. 
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2. On the other hand, the overall level of total public external debt in 
1982 averaged nearly 4.5 times as much for Group II countries as is 
the case for Group I countries. 
3. The level of international reserves is also much higher for Group II 
countries --nearly ten times as much as the average for Group I 
countries. 
4. With regard to shares of debt in gross domestic product, however, 
Group I countries have much higher levels of attainment, 
averaging nearly twice as much as Group II countries in both 1970 
and 1982. The d~bt service ratio to exports is correspondingly 
higher for Group I countries. 
5. The rate of growth of imports was nearly ten times higher over the 
1970-1982 period for Group II countries. 
In terms of other indicies, the Group II countries are considerably 
larger, more affluent (in terms of per capita income), and less reliant on 
external debt as a percentage of gross domestic product. They tend to spend 
relatively large amounts 'on military activities, but not necessarily 
significantly greater amounts of their overall budgets. Given relatively 
fewer constraints, the Group II countries should have a relatively easier time 
in attaining some optimal balance beween arms imports, total military 
expenditures and the level of personnel (armed forces). 
Effect of Economic Environment on Arms Imports 
Logically, arms imports should be related to the overall ability of the 
country to purchase weapons. This effective demand for weapons can be 
proxied by either military expenditures (ME) or the general level of central 
government expenditures (GEC). The composition of military forces 
between equipment and troops (AF) together with the ability to substitute 
one for the other will also condition the incentive to import additional 
weapons --especially during times of severe foreign exchange scarcity. 
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The hypothesis to be tested here is that the constrained (Group I) 
countries financed a large proportion of their military expenditures with 
public external indebtedness. In our model for these countries public 
external debt (PDB) would have a positive sign when regressed on arms 
imports. On the other hand, unconstrained countries, given alternative 
sources of funding, should not experience a particularly strong link between 
arms imports and public external debt. 
Several other structural factors were also considered significant· in 
affecting arms imports. Everything else equal, whether or not the country 
was an arms producer (PRODUCE) should be a factor in affecting arms 
imports. For purposes of analysis,· producer and non-producer countries 
were classified following Neuman's definition of arms producers as 
countries capable of producing at least one major weapon system. 16 
Arms producers should have higher levels of technical and industrial 
capabilities relative to those countries lacking an indigenous arms industry. 
Furthermore, the linkages between military expenditures and the economy, 
together with the import component of military equipment associated with 
a given level of military expenditures· should be considerably different for 
arms producers and non-producers. 
In general, we would imagine the non-producers to be much more 
reliant on imports of military equipment to meet a given level of defense 
expenditures. Furthermore, given the high cost of sophisticated imported 
weaponry, we would expect a high proportion of it, ceteris paribus, to be 
financed by external debt. 
Given their relative flexibility to expand weapons production, 
countries which are both arms producers and resource unconstrained should 
experience over time the greatest reduction in arms imports. 
16 
Neuman, Stephanie, "International Stratification and Third World Military 
Industries," International Organization, Winter 1984, pages 167-197. 
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Finally, to the extent that third world countries produce their own 
weapons systems, we would expect a looser relationship to exist between 
arms imports and overall public external indebtedness. That is because 
equipment can be obtained from local sources in addition to imports, with 
added domestic inputs occurring when the country's credit-worthiness 
might be placed in jeopardy by additional external borrowing to finance 
arms acquisitions. 
Since data are not available on the actual value of arms output•in third 
world countries, the effect of arms production on arms imports was 
estimated by creating a dummy variable (PRODUCE) with values of zero 
for the countries not having an indigenous arms industry and one for those 
possessing such an industry. The expected sign of this variable is negative 
in the regression equation, that is everything else equal, indigenous arms 
production should reduce the nee<J for imported arms. 
Political/security factors were introduced by utilizing Rothstein's 
classification of countries based on political/ security and resource 
constraint considerations. 17 Those countries which have a high level of 
internal and/ or external threat·combined with a low level of governmental 
legitimacy and effectiveness were assigned a value of one (CONFLICT = I) 
and those with a high level of governmental legitimacy and faced relatively 
low internal and/ or external threats were assgined a value of zero 
(CONFLICT = 0). 
In summary the "need" for weapons (CONFLICT), together with the 
ability to purchase and/ or substitute local resources will determine the 
general range of arms imports. 
17 
Cf. Rothstein, Robert L., "The 'Security Dilemma' and the 'Poverty Trap' in the Third 
World," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, December 1986, pages 1-38; and 
Rothstein, Robert L., "National Security, Dolilestic Resource Constraints and Elite Choices in 
the Third World,"in Deger, Saadat and West, Rober (eds.), Defense, Security, 1md Develop-
ment, London: Frances Pinter, 1987, pages 140-158. 
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(I) Arms Imports (AI) 
AI = [ME(+), PDB(+c, ?uc), PRODUCE(?uc, +c), 
AF(-c, ?uc), CONFLICT(+)] 
where: 
ME = Military Expenditures 
c = Resource Constrained Countries and 
UC = Resource Unconstrained Countries 
PDB = Public External Debt 
Produce= Arms Producer 
AF = Armed Forces Personnel 
Factors Affecting Arms Production 
Limited economic and financial resources explain, at least partially, the 
difficulties of third world countries in developing an independent weapons 
industry. The development of an arms industry, especially a totally 
independent one, requires very large f!nancial resources. These are often 
beyond the reach of most third world states. It is well-known that even 
some of the advanced industrial nations such as Britain and France have 
been compelled to cancel military production plans due to financial 
difficulties. 
In short, we might expect that countries with relatively abundant 
sources of foreign exchange and domestic savings capable of being 
appropriated by governments are likely to be the arms producers. 
An examination of the means of various indicators of economic 
performance, external . debt and structural composition of the arms 
producers and non-producers indicates that the arms producers can be 
characterized as possessing much higher levels of domestic savings, less 
export instability, superior export performance, higher external debt, but a 
• 
much lower debt burden (as a percent of GDP) and higher captial inflows 
than the non-producing countries. 
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In fact, in a recent study, Looney and Frederiksen, using discriminant 
analysis, indicated that a nearly perfect classification of Latin American 
arms producers and non-porducers could be made using only debt and 
import/ export indicators as discriminating variables. 18 That study also 
demonstrated that military and size variables were not capable of discrimi-
nating between arms producers and non-producers. Interestingly enough, 
debt and external variables and their relative magnitudes are nearly 
identical to those used above to discriminate between the constrained and 
unconstrained countries, with producers very similar to unco~strained 
countries and non-producers in general behaving in a manner similar to 
constrained countries. 
Based on these considerations we should expect the arms producers to 
have relatively strong balance of payments positions. 
(2) Military Production (PRODUCE) 
where: 




= Trade gap as a percentage of GNP 
= Exte'rnal Public Indebtedness in 1972 
= Average annual growth in exports during 
1970-1982 
While not anticipating a significant result, overall economic size as 
proxied by gross national product (GNP) was included in the regression 
equation for completeness. 
Military Expenditures and Public External Indebtedness 
The recycling of the flood of petro-dollars which followed increases in 
oil prices in 1973 resulted in large amounts of money being lent by Western 
~ . 
Looney, Robert and Frederiksen, P.C., "Profiles of Latin American Arms Producers," 
International Organization, Summer 1986, pages 745-752. 
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banking syndicates to third world countries in anticipation of relatively high 
rates of return. In retrospect, it is clear that while some of the money was 
used to finance development projects which presumably would generate 
sufficient income to repay the loans, much of it was used for increased 
consumption and capital flight. There is also the suspicion among many 
observers that a considerable amount of this funding was used to finance 
higher levels of military expenditures. 19 
Support for this position is largely based on two similar trends that 
developed in the 1970s and early 1980s. More specifically, government and 
government-guaranteed debts of the non-oil developing countries grew 
from $130 billion in 1973 to $729 billion in 1984, accounting for 85 percent 
of the external debts of developing countries. The value of arms transferred 
to non-oil developing countries more than doubled in real terms between 
1972 and 1982 and their share of total world arms transfers increased from 
31 percent to 41 percent in the same period. 20 Analysts stressing the link 
between arms imports and third world debt note that these two patterns 
represent more than just a coincidence. 
Further substantiation of the link between arms transfers and public 
external debt is found in the fact that. a,rms purchases grew in importance 
during the 1970s as the two major arms donors switched their policy from 
one of gifts to one of sales. 21 
Weapons purchased with scarce foreign exchange have an obvious 
allocation cost in terms of reduced resources available for aiding socio-
economic development. Clearly, however, whether or not third world 
countries have reduced their borrowing for these purposes proportionally 
to the amount spend on arms imports is quite conjectural and ultimately 
resolved only by empirical testing. 
19 . 
Tullerg, R., "Military-Related Debt in N.on-Oil Developing Countries, 1972-1982," 
Bulletin of Peace Proposah, 1986, page 261. 
20 
Ibid., page 262. 
21 
Brzoska, Michael, "The Military-Related Exterpal Debt of Third World Countries," 
]ourn4/ of Peace Research, 1983, pages 271-278. 
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The model developed below attempts to identify the role played by 
military expenditures in affecting external indebtedness.22 For this purpose, 
a formal model indicating the equilibrium level of external debt is 
developed. This equilibrium level is solved for by a "reduced form" equation 
derived from a set of relationships that account for the major supply and 
demand determinants of external debt. H 
In selecting variables responsible for the volume of public external 
debt ac_cumulated by 1982, it is reasonable as a first step to assu!lie that a 
country's size will have a direct relationship both to the amount of external 
indebtedness and its capacity to service this debt. Clearly, a large country as 
measured by GNP will ceteri! paribus have more financial and commercial 
relations with the rest of the world economy and, therefore, will be more 
likely to accumulate a larger debt volume than a small country. At the same 
time, due to the diversity of output and resource base, the debt servicing 
capacity of a large country is apt to be greater than that of a small country 
(and, consequently, a larger external debt can be accumulated). In general, 
we postulate that the larger the LDC economy, as measured by its gross 
national product (GNP), the greater its demand for external indebtedness. 
Second, a country's external debt should, in general, be related to its 
general volume of merchandise imports (Tl). For LDCs, the volume of 
merchandise imports often tends to have a direct relationship to the 
country's GNP, thus providing an additional source of demand for debt. 
Since in a growing economy a share of imports will have to be financed, a 
country's indebtedness will be higher as total imports increase. 
Third, international reserve holdings may be another important factor 
in affecting the volume of a country's external debt. Here the relationship is 
likely to be more complex. Logically, as a country's reserves increase, its 
22 
The model is based on that developed by Heller, H. Robert and Frenkel, E., 
"Determinants of LDC Indebtedness," The Columbia]oNrnal of World BNsineu, Spring 1982, 
pages 28-34. 
2~ 
External debt is defined as public external debt owed to non-residents and repayable in 
foreign currency and having a maturity of over one year. 
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ability to service a growing external debt and, hence, its credit worthiness 
should also increase. On the other hand, everything else equal, one might 
expect that the larger a country's external revenues, the less pressing the 
need for additional debt to finance imports. Therefore, possession of a large 
volume of international reserves may result in larger or smaller volumes of 
external debt. 
Finally, three types of governmental expe~ditures --military (ME), 
health (H) and education (E) were introduced as independent variables in 
the demand for external debt.24 
Clearly, because of multicolinearity between the independent variables 
defined above, it is not possible to determine through regression analysis 
the percent of LDC public external debt stemming from military expendi-
tures. Given this constraint, the analysis below attempts to answer the two 
part question of (a) whether military expenditures (after controlling f~r 
GDP, imports, reserves, and other independent variables) have signifcantly 
contributed to LDC external indebtedness and, (b) if so, what type of 
environments have been most conducive to external borrowing for the 
purpose of increasing military expenditures. 
The next step in the analysis is to isolate the main supply and demand 
influences on third world indebtedness by deriving a reduced form equation 
that is capable of measuring the influence of all independent variables 
simultaneously. 
In the specification, Gross National Product (GNP), was the principal 
demand variable, followed by total imports (Tl), and the individual public 
sector expenditures: military expenditures (ME), health (H), and education 
(E). 
24 
Government expenditures on health and education were taken from Sivard, Ruth, 
World Military and Social Expenditures, 1983, Washington, DC: Wortd Priorities, 1983. 
Military expenditure data were taken from tJ.s. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1975-1982, Washington, DC: ACDA, 1984. 
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On the supply side, the main variable was foreign reserves (GIRB). 
Notationally: 
a) Total debt (PDB) supply = fl (reserves), and 
b) Total debt (PDB) demand = f2 (GNP, military expenditures, 
education expenditures, health expenditures) 
c) Total debt (supply) = total debt (demand) and,.. dividing 
equations (a) and (b) by the equilibrium level of total debt as 
specified in equation (c), we obtain equation (d) 
d) fl (total debt) = f2 (total debt) expressing equation (d), we can 
write 
e) xl [fl (total debt) - f2 (total debt)], = 0, or 
f) x2 (total debt, GDP, imports, reserves, military expenditures, 
eduational expenditures, health expenditures = 0. 
(3) Public External Debt (PDB) 
PDB = [GNP(+), TI(+), GIRB(-c, ?uc), ME(+c, ?uc), H(?), 
E(?)] 
Total Imports 
The import variable (Tl) is intended to identify several critical 
differences between resource constrained and unconstrained countries with 
regard to their flexibility in meeting increased defense requirements. 
Presumably the resource constrained countries will be forced to turn to local 
materials and personnel relative to their unconstrained counterparts when 
expanding overall military expenditures. In part this stems from their lack 
of foreign exchange to import extra weapons, but also from the fact that 
scarce foreign exchange will also qave to be conserved for other priority 
allocations deemed necessary by the government (GEC). These countries 
will also have to earmark foreign exchange to assure that service can be 
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maintained and spare parts obtained to keep prior arms imports (AIL) 
operational. 
Since the resource constrained countries have in most cases borrowed 
close to their limits, we would expect any additional debt to be earmarked 
for high priority situations and not related to the overall level of imports. 
That is, the higher the level of prior external debt, (PDBL), the less likely 
imports will be related to the level of external public debt in any particul,ar 
year: 
(4) Total Imports (Tl) 
TI== [GEC(+c, ?uc), PDBL(?uc, +c), ME(-c, ?uc),AIL(+c, ?uc)] 
Military Expenditures 
Total military expenditures are assumed to be largely a function of the 
level of armed forces personnel (AF), the overall size of the economy 
(GNP), and the ability of countries to finance added expenditures in the 
short run (proxied by the level of gross international reserves --GIRB). 
Since military expenditures have hign priority in most countries, we would 
expect some relationship between past external debt and levels of allocation 
of the military. This pattern is likely to be more pronounced in the resource 
constrained countries given their lack of alternative financing. In the short 
run, some increases in military expenditures can be financed from 
government deficits (GDB --revenues minus expenditures). Again, for 
reasons noted above the resource constrained countries are more likely to be 
forced to resort to this type of financing for increased levels of defense 
expenditures: 
(5) Military Expenditures (ME) 
ME== [AF(+), GNP(+), GIRB(+), PDBL(+c, ?uc), 
GDB(-c, ?uc)] 
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Other Factors 
The model is closed with four additional equations: total government 
expenditures, health expenditures, education expenditures, and the size of 
the armed forces. The logic behind the selection of the independent 
variables for each, together with their expected signs is similar to that given 
for the five functional equations above. Equations 7 and 8 do however 
explicitly introduce an added factor --the likely tradeoff between defense 
expenditures and education and health that will be faced by the resource 
constrained countries: 
(6) Total Government Expenditures (GEC) 
GEC= [GNP(+), PDBL(+c, ?uc), GIRB(+), AFPL(+c, ?uc) 
(7) Health Expenditures (H) 
H = [GEC(+), ME(-c, ?uc), PDBL(+c, ?uc)] 
(8) Education Expenditures (E) 
E = [GEC(+), ME(-c, ?uc), PDBL(+c, ?uc)] 
(9) Armed Forces (AF) 
AF = [POP(+), GNP(+), GIRB(+c, ?uc), PDBL(+c+c, ?uc)] 
Finally, the last two equations examine the consequences of resource 
constraint, arms production, arms imports, and threat for several measures 
of the defense burden --the share of defense expenditures in the central 
government budget (GEDB) and the share of military expenditures in gross 
national product (MEY). 
(10) Defense Share in Central Government Budget (GEDB) 
GEDB = [PRODUCE(+), Al(+), AFPL(+), Conflict(+)) 
(11) Share of military eJr4>enditures in GNP (MEY) 
MEY = [PRODUCE(-), GEDB(+), Al(+c, ?uc)] 
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IV. RESULTS 
The results show several intesting patterns. (For specifics see 
Appendix I). In particular: 
1) Arms imports in constrained countries have a particularly strong 
link with total military expenditures. This link, while still 
significant is not nearly as strong (as evidenced by the standardized 
regression coefficient and t-values) for the unconstrained 
countries. Apparently, the unconstrained countries have more 
degrees of freedom in reaching some optimal balance between 
total military expenditures,' arms imports, domestic production 
and armed forces. 
2) Given the decidedly higher r2 for arms imports in equations la and 
lb (relative to equation 1) it appears that foreign exchange 
availability per se must be as or more important than political or 
strategic factors in affecting arms imports. Put differently, it 
appears that foreign exchange controls the amount of arms 
imports much more precisely than the "need" or "desire" for 
additional armaments. 
3) As anticipated, external debt has been associated with arms 
imported by the constrained countries (but not the unconstrained). 
4) Both constrained and unconstrained countries were, ceteris 
paribus, able to reduce their overall level of arms imports through 
the indigenous production of arms, but perhaps because of their 
relative access to foreign exchange, the unconstrained countries 
were able to expand domestic production to a greater extent, thus 
replacing a larger volume of imports. 
5) The overall availability of resources as proxied by gross national 
product does not appear to be a factor affecting third world arms 
production --instead foreign exchange availability as proxied by 
the relative growth of exports andjtoldings of gross international 
reserves (depicted by the relative surplus in the balance of 
payments) differentiates arms producers from non··producers. 
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6) The high statistical significance and negative sign for armed 
forces in the resource constrained countries (but not in the 
unconstrained countries), suggests that foreign exchange 
shortage has forced large groups of countries to substitute 
personnel for imported equipment. 
7) This conclusion is reinforced by the negative sign on military 
expenditure term in the total imports equation for resource 
constrained countries --these countries must conserve fo~eign 
exchange for "essential" imports such as food and certain raw 
materials needed to maintain industrial production. 
S) As might be anticipated·, unconstrained countries are more able to 
reach an optimal mix between armed forces and total military 
expenditures (as evidenced by the positive statistical significance 
of AF in equation 5a, but not in 5b in Appendix I). 
9) Constrained countries have a close link between armed forces and 
the overall level of government expenditures, indicating the 
relatively labor intensive composition qf military expenditures. 
10) Constrained countries face a zero sum option in terms of 
budgetary tradeoffs between military expenditures and socio-
economic activities (the negative sign on military expenditures in 
equations 7a and Sa in Appendix I --as opposed to statistically 
insignificant values in equations 7b and Sb. 
11) Given their relative inflexibility in producing and importing arms, 
resource constrained countries exhibit a much closer relationship 
between arms imports and the share of military expenditures in 
GNP (equation lla vs. llb). 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The results presented above are suggestive of the importance of 
economic variables in affecting the pat~rn of arms imports to the third 
world. While this finding is not particularly novel, it does indicate the 
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fruitfulness of incorporating economic considerations, not only as factors 
affecting the supply of weapons, but their demand as well. Perhaps the lack 
of attention given to economic variables in the past stems from the fact that 
rather weak relationships exist when these factors are regressed on various 
aspects of militarization in developing countries as a whole. This is not the 
case, however, when third world countries are examined as more 
homogenous groups on the basis of their general degree of resource scarcity. 
Using this two-group approach, several general conclusions can be made 
concerning the observed patterns of arms importation by the third world. 
1. Third world countries are not homogenous with regard to the 
factors affecting arms imports, overall miiltary expenditures, and 
arms production. It appears that access to foreign exchange is the 
common thread in accounting for fundamental differences 
between these countries with regard to both the production and 
importation of arms. 
2. Similarly, the use of public external indebtedness to finance arms 
imports does not appear to be universal among developing 
countries. In fact, it is pos'sible that a large group of relatively 
debt-free (debt as a percent of GDP) resource unconstrained 
countries have contained military expenditures within the limits 
imposed by self-financing rather than risk jeopardizing their 
overall credit worthiness. 
3. On the other hand, it is possible that a large proportion of the debt 
accumulated by the resource constrained group of LDCs has 
stemmed from military expenditures. Apparently, the perceived 
need to expand defense expenditures by this group in the face of 
foreign exchange shortages has resulted in relatively high levels of 
external indebtedness measured either as a percent of exports or 
GNP for the group as a whole. 
4. Indigenous arms production irt the third world has tended to 
reduce the importation of arms. Again, however, the extent of 
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this reduction may vary by country wpe with the most significant 
reductions occurring in countries with relatively abundant 
supplies of foreign exchange. 
5. Finally, it appears that arms imports most likely will not reach 
levels attained in the late 1970s due not so much to a general spirit 
of constraint on the part of suppliers and recipients, but more to 
lack of foreign exchange on part of many of the third world 
countries, and the development of indigenous production 
capabilities on the part of others. 
~»,_ _______ _ 
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Appendix I 
The regression coefficients are in standardized form to facilitate a 
direct comparison of the relative strength of each variable. (This analysis is 
for the year 1981. This period roughly coincides with the classification 
schemes of Neuman and Rothstein. This period was also selected because it 
came at the end of a decade of rapidly increased third world borrowing in 
external markets. It is clear that external financial markets changed 
fundamentally after the de facto Mexican default in 1982. Also 1981 marks 
the end of the world wide boom in exports and imports. It is to early for the 
post 1982 events to be incorporated systematically in analysis of the type 
attempted here. However the results obtained here are suggestive of a 
number of patterns likely to develop in the later part of the 1980s). 
(Two Stage Least Squares Estimates, standardized coefficients) 
Arms Imports (Al) 
total sample 
(1) AI= -0.24 PROD + 1.12 ME - 0.19 PDB - 0.19 AF - 0.15 CONF 
(-1.47) (5.11) .. (-1.33) (-0.95) (-1.24) 
2 
r = 0.648; F = 9.92 
resource constrained countries 
(la) AI= -0.05 PROD + 0.81 ME + 0.35 PDB - 0.21 AF + 0.01 CONF 
(-2.06) (15.69) (6.31) (-6.34) (0.61) 
2 
r = 0.993; F = 426.8 
resource unconstrained countries 
(lb) AI= -0.76 PROD + 0.44 ME - 0.28 PDB + 0.25 AF - 0.21 CONF 
(-6.34) (2.08) (-2.36) ( 1.17) (-1.88) 
2 
r = 0.994; F = 16.7 
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Arms Production (PRODUCE) 
total sample 
(2) PRODUCE = 0.25 BIY + 0.13 GNP + 0.30 PDA + 0.40 EGB 
(1.40) (0.61) (1.42) (2.06) 
2 
r = 0.412; F = 4.01 
resource constrained countries 
(2a) PRODUCE = - 0.13 BIY + 0.12 GNP + 0.37 PDA + 0.18 EGB 
(-0.61) (0.3 7) (0.95) (0.83) 
2 ~ 
r = 0.428; F = 3.04 
resource unconstrained countries 
(2b) PRODUCE = 1.ll BIY - 0.04 GNP + 0.06 PDA + 0.26 EGB 
(7.17) (-0.31) (0.44) (1.81) 
2 
r = 0.928; F = 19.1 
Public External Debt (PDB) 
total sample 
(3) PDB = 0.64 GNP+ 0.54 TI - 0.20 GIRB - 0.04 ME - 0.08 E + O.ll H 
(3.41) (5.54) (~2'.60) (-0.65) (-0.35) (1.07) 
2 • 
r = 0.947; F = 77.9 
resource constrained countries 
(3a) PDB = 0.07 GNP+ 0.48 TI - 0.12 GIRB + 0.40 ME+ 0.67 E - 0.61 H 
(1.16) (2.63) (-1.31) (3.64) (4.58) (-4.48) 
2 
r = 0.968; F = 76.0 
resource unconstrained countries 
(3b) PDB = 1.04 GNP+ 0.44 TI - 0.01 GIRB - 0.14 ME - 0.41 E + 0.02 H 
(6.58) (7.75) (-0.24) (-2.94) (-2.25) (0.22) 
2 
r = 0.993; F = 99.4 
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Total Imports (Tl) 
total sample 
(4) TI= - 0.56 GEC + 1.19 POBL + 0.63 ME - 0.33 AIL 
(-2.01) (4.47) (3.14) (-1.03) 
r
2 
= 0.872; F = 44.4 
resource constrained countries 
(4a) TI= 1.55 GEC - 0.14 POBL - 1.22 ME+ 0.75 AIL 
(6.83) (-0.58) (-4.23) (2.10) 
2 
r = 0.962; F = 95.2 
resource unconstrained countries 
(4b) TI= - 1.10 GEC + 1.74 POBL + 0.45 ME - 0.35 AIL 
(-2.05) (3.41) ( 1.19) (-0.93) 
r2 = 0.836; F = 7.5 
Total Military Expenditures (ME) 
total sample 
(5) ME= 0.47 POBL + 0.34 GIRB + 0.70 AF - 0.23 GNP - 0.53 GOB 
(l.73) (2.87) (6.59) (-2.64) (-1.92) 
2 
r = 0.801; F = 21.7 
resource constrained countries 
(5a) ME= 0.53 POBL + 0.42 GIRB + 0.19 AF - 0.07 GNP - 0.26 GOB 
(2.93) (3.76) ( 1.01) (-0.59) (-2.25) 
2 
r = 0.912; F = 33.9 
resource unconstrained countries 
(5b) ME= 0.01POBL+0.04 GIRB + 0.89 AF - 0.11 GNP - 0.09 GOB 
(0.01) (0.17) (3.53) (-0.13) (-0.33) 
2 
r = 0.735; F = 2.8 
Looney: Economic Factors Affecting the Third World ... 
Government Expenditures (GEC) 
total sample 
(6) GEC = 0.70 GNP+ 0.21 PDBL + 0.12 GIRB + 0.10 .AFPL 
(6.21) (1.97) (3.04) (3.04) 
r
2 
= 0.976; F = 285.7 
resource constrained countries 
(6a) GEC = 0.13 GNP+ 0.30 PDBL + 0.20 GIRB + 0.51 .AFPL 
(1.85) (3.52) (2.95) (6.23) 
2 
r = 0.970; F = 48.9 
resource unconstrained countries 
(6b) GEC = 0.78 GNP+ 0.17 PDBL + 0.14 GIRB + 0.06 .AFPL 
(3.23) (0.73) (1.74) (0.67) 
2 
r = 0.970; F = 48.9 
Health Expenditures (H) 
total sam pie 
(7) H = 0.95 GEC - 0.14 ME - 0.55 PDBL 
( 4.95) (-1.09) (-1.84) 
2 
r = 0.797; F = 37.9 
resource constrained countries 
(7a) H = 2.10 GEC - 1.32 ME+ 0.03 PDBL 
(7.32) (-3.84) (0.15) 
2 
r = 0.879; F = 43.7 
resource unconstrained countries 
(7b) H = 1.40 GEC - 0.04 ME - 0.60 PDBL 
(2.40) (-0.19) (-1.02) 
2 
r = 0.737; F = 6.51 
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Education Expenditures (E) 
total sample 
(8) E = 1.12 GEC + 0.08 ME - 0.21 PDBL 
(8.04) (1.74) (-1.47) 
r
2 
= 0.797; F = 37.9 
resource constrained countries 
(8a) E = 1.45 GEC - 1.28 ME+ 0.78 PDBL 
(6.93) (-5.13) (5.37) 
2 . 
r = 0.936; F = 87.3 
resource unconstrained countries 
(8b) E = 1.27 GEC + 0.16 ME - 0.35 PDBL 
(5.32) ( 1.95) (-1.47) 
2 
r = 0.956; F = 11.0 
Armed Forces (AF) 
total sample 
(9) AF= 0.85 POP - 0.50 GNP+ 0.04 GIRB + 0.71 PDBL + 0.13 CONF 
(9.24) (-1.92) (0.35) (1.66) (1.66) 
2 
r = 0.863; F = 31.5 
resource constrained countries 
(9a) AF= 0.77 POP - 0.07 GNP+ 0.20 GIRB + 0.30 PDBL + 0.10 CONF 
(10.64) (-0.87) (2.67) (4.02) (1.81) 
r2 = 0.956; F = 70.1 
resource unconstrained countries 
(9b) AF= 0.94 POP - 0.31 GNP - 0.09 GIRB - 0.45 PDBL + 0.21 CONF 
(4.95) (-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.70) (1.02) 
r
2 
= 0.875; F = 7.0 
I 
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Share of Defense Expenditures in Central Government Budget (GEDB) 
total country sample 
(10) GEDB = - 0.01 PROD+ 0.43 AI + 0.39 AFPL + 0.40 CONF 
(-0.04) (2.57) (2.49) (3.49) 
2 
r :: 0.665; F :: 13.9 
resource constrained countries 
(lOa) GEDB = - 0.05 PROD+ 0.50 AI+ 0.30 AFPL + 0.34 CONF 
(-0.39) ( 1.36) (0.82) (2.45) 
2 
r = 0.671; F :: 8.65 
resource unconstrained countries 
(lOb) GEDB:: - 0.79 PROD+ 0.68 AI+ 0.85 AFPL + 0.31 CONF 
(2.25) (2.96) (2.57) (1.52) 
2 
r = 0.884; F = 8.12 
Share of Military Expendiutre in GNP (MEY) 
total country sample 
(11) MEY= - 0.23 PROD+ 0.34 GEDB + 0.65 AI 
(-2.53) (3.00) (5.45) 
r
2 
= 0.767; F = 31.9 
resource constrained countries 
(lla) MEY= - 0.10 PROD+ 0.31GEDB+0.75 AI 
(-1.42) (3.34) (7.74) 
2 
r = 0.930; F = 79.9 
resource unconstrained countries 
(llb) MEY= - 0.89 PROD+ 0.32 GEDB - 0.08 AI 
(-10.07) ( 4.28) (-0.82) 
r
2 
= 0.972; F = 81.5 
• 
